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We empirically study bidding in the C Block of the US mobile phone spectrum auctions. 
Spectrum auctions are conducted using a simultaneous ascending auction design that allows 
bidders to assemble packages of licenses with geographic complementarities. While this auction 
design allows the market to find complementarities, the auction might also result in an inefficient 
equilibrium. In addition, these auctions have equilibria where implicit collusion is sustained 
through threats of bidding wars. We estimate a structural model in order to test for the presence 
of complementarities and implicit collusion. The estimation strategy is valid under a wide variety 
of alternative assumptions about equilibrium in these auctions and is robust to potentially 
important forms of unobserved heterogeneity. We make suggestions about the design of future 
spectrum auctions. 1 Introduction
The US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) auctions licenses of radio spectrum for mobile
phone service. Based on the recommendations ofacademic economists, the FCCemploys aninnovative
simultaneous ascending auction. Bidding lasts for multiple rounds, and there is simultaneous bidding
on all licenses in all rounds. The sale of all licenses closes when no more new bids for any license
are forthcoming. Simultaneous ascending auctions allow bidders, mobile phone carriers in spectrum
auctions, to assemble packages of licenses exhibiting the potential for substantial complementarities
(or synergies) across licenses. For instance, a carrier that holds two geographically adjacent licenses
can offer mobile phone users a greater geographically contiguous coverage area. The auction format’s
novelty and the economic importance of mobile phone markets have stimulated a large and vibrant
theoretical literature. With the notable exception of the papers listed below, however, there is relatively
little empirical work concerning the spectrum auctions.
We study data from the 1995–1996 auction of licenses for the C Block of the 1900 MHz PCS spec-
trum band, where the ﬁnal bids totaled $10.1 billion. The C block divided the United States into 493
small, geographically distinct licenses. The intent of auctioning small licenses was to allow a market
mechanism rather than a regulator to determine the allocation of licenses so that the licenses are more
likely to be used efﬁciently. Unfortunately, the auction might not maximize welfare from comple-
mentarities because the auction might possess inefﬁcient equilibria. Efﬁciency might suffer if bidders
implicitly collude through the threat of intimidatory bidding wars. For example, a bidder trying to add
an additional license to a package to take advantage of complementarities might be punished by higher,
retaliatory bids on its other licenses. Our contribution is to assess efﬁciency in these auctions and to
determine whether implicit collusion prevented the efﬁcient division of licenses into complementary
packages.
In this paper, we propose and estimate a structural model of bidding in the C block spectrum
auction. Our estimator has three novel features that contribute to the literature on the analysis of
multiple unit auctions. First, like the estimator proposed by Haile and Tamer (2003), our estimator
does not require the economist to make speciﬁc assumptions about which equilibrium was played in
the data. There is no widely accepted theoretical model of bidding in spectrum auctions. Indeed, the
theoretical problems of existence, uniqueness and characterization of equilibrium are far from resolved
for dynamic, multiple unit auctions of the sort that we consider. Therefore, an estimation strategy that
makes the minimal possible assumptions about the speciﬁc equilibrium being played in these markets
is attractive for empirical work. Second, our estimates of bidder valuations will be consistent even
if there is omitted heterogeneity in the form of license speciﬁc attributes that are valued equally by
bidders but unobserved to the econometrician. Third, our estimation strategy allows for an extremely
large, but discrete set of possible choices. This is crucial for our application since the number of
possible packages that bidders can assemble is extremely large.
The C block auction is a unique experiment in modern business history. Only investors that were
2not associated with incumbent mobile phone carriers were allowed to bid in the C block. We choose
to analyze data from the C block instead of the AB or DEF blocks for two other reasons. First, legal
restrictions on incumbent phone companies make speciﬁcation of the relevant choice sets quite com-
plicated in the other spectrum auctions. Also, the number of ﬁrms that bid is larger in the C block than
the AB block, yielding more observations for empirical work.
There are separate descriptive empirical literatures on complementarities and collusion in spectrum
auctions. On complementarities, Ausubel, Cramton, McAfee and McMillan (1997) and Moreton and
Spiller (1998) document that bidders purchased licenses that were geographically adjacent, and that
winning bids are higher in markets where the second-highest bidder won adjacent licenses. For collu-
sion, empirical research by Cramton and Schwartz (2000) and Cramton and Schwartz (2002) presents
descriptive evidence that bidders in AB block did not aggressively compete for licenses and in the later
DEF block auction used the last digits of numeric bids to signal rivals not to bid on other licenses.
Next, we turn to the problem of estimation. A main difﬁculty with estimation is, as discussed
above, that there is no generally agreed upon model of bidding in spectrum auctions. While there is an
extensive literature on structural estimation of auction models, most of these models assume that the
econometrician has considerable information about the equilibrium to the game realized in the data.
(See Donald and Paarsch (1993) and Donald and Paarsch (1996), Elyakime, Laffont, Loisel and Vuong
(1994), Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000), Campo, Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000), Athey and
Levin (2001), Campo (2001), Flambard and Perrigne (2002), Hortacsu (2002), Hendricks, Pinkse and
Porter (2003), Bajari and Ye (2003), Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003), Fevrier, Préget and Visser
(2003), Cantillon and Pesendorfer (2003), Athey, Levin and Seira (2004) and Krasnokutskaya (2004).)
In the spirit of Haile and Tamer (2003), we search for predictions that are robust across a wide range
of theoretical models. One prediction that must hold in any equilibrium model (with pure strategies)
is that at the end of the auction, a bidder’s continuation value from the chosen action must be at least
as large as the continuation value from actions that are not chosen. We use this system of revealed
preference inequalities to form an estimate of a bidder’s continuation value for bidding on a particular
package.
An attractive feature of our estimator is that license-speciﬁc omitted variables that are valued
equally by bidders are “differenced out” and do not bias estimates of the other structural parameters.
Because we make weak assumptions about the data generating process, we are only able to recover
information about within-auction continuation values, not the post-auction bidder valuations for al-
ternative licenses. However, our estimates of the continuation values allow us to judge the relative
importance of implicit collusion and complementarities in the packages that bidders assembled at the
end of the auction.
First, we ask if geographic complementarities between licenses in a package are important deter-
minants of continuation values. If strong complementarities are found, a more concentrated allocation
of licenses than that observed in the auction might increase bidder surplus. Second, we ask whether the
observed bidding appears to be collusive. If so, bidders are to some degree intimidated by the aggres-
3siveness of rivals, and bidding may not produce a socially efﬁcient assignment of packages of licenses
to bidders. In particular, if bidders fear setting off a bidding war, they may not assemble packages that
maximize the surplus from geographic complementarities.
Our continuation value estimates will provide evidence about these questions. For example, if com-
plementarities present in a package of licenses enter signiﬁcantly into bidder continuation values, this
is evidence that a bidder’s choices at the end of the auction are inﬂuenced by such complementarities.
Our estimates will not allow us to say much about why complementarities are important determinants
of continuation values. For example, a bidder might value a package with complementarities because
it leads to increased proﬁtability in its own operations or because it will lead to a higher resale value.
Distinguishing between these two possibilities would require stronger assumptions about which equi-
librium is being played within the auction and exactly how competition will proceed in the post-auction
mobile phone industry. Such assumptions would be controversial given that the equilibria to these mar-
kets are not well understood.
Our results have implications for auction design. The United States government issues spectrum
auctions for relatively small geographic areas (493 markets in the auction we study), while European
countries often issue nationwide licenses. The US licensing system, together with the possibility of
collusion, encourages more mobile phone carriers to win licenses at the risk that these companies are
operating below the efﬁcient scale because of the lack of geographic complementarities. Rules for the
forthcoming Advanced Wireless Services (AWS) auction indicate that, for some spectrum blocks, the
FCC is altering its licensing policy as it now plans to issue only twelve licenses for the entire United
States. For other spectrum blocks in the AWS auction, the FCC is auctioning 734 distinct geographic
licenses. Understanding the relative merits of small and large licenses requires systematic numbers
about whether bidders do indeed have complementarities across licenses. In addition, auctioning larger
licenses may inhibit the ability of bidders to implicitly collude by reducing the level of multi-market
contact.
2 Background for the C Block Auction
2.1 FCC Spectrum Auctions for Mobile Phones
Wireless phones transmit on the publicly owned radio spectrum. In order to prevent interference from
multiple radio transmissions on the same frequency, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
issues spectrum users licenses to transmit onspeciﬁed frequencies. Wireless phones intheUnited States
transmit on two major regions of radio spectrum. The FCC assigned 800 MHz licenses in the 1980’s
using comparative worth regulatory hearings, lotteries, and induced partnerships among applicants. In
the 1990’s, Congress and the Clinton administration decided the mobile phone industry could support
more competitors, and so the FCC allocated additional spectrum in the 1900 MHz (PCS) block to
mobile phone carriers. For the PCS block of radio spectrum, the FCC assigned spectrum licenses using
4auctions.
There were three initial auctions of mobile phone spectrum between 1995 and 1997. The ﬁrst
auction (the AB blocks) sold 99 licenses for 30 MHz of spectrum for 51 large geographic regions and
raised $7.0 billion for the US Treasury. The second auction (the C block) sold 493 30 MHz licenses in
more narrowly deﬁned geographic regions to smaller bidders that met certain eligibility criteria. The
C block auction closed with winning bids totaling $10.1 billion, although some bidders were unable
to make payments, and their licenses were later re-auctioned. The third auction (the DEF blocks) sold
three licenses for 10 MHz in each of the same 493 markets as the C block. The bids totaled $2.5 billion
in the DEF blocks.
There are a number of reasons to prefer to use data from the C block auction instead of the AB or
DEF blocks. First, the number of observations is much larger in the C block: there are 255 bidders in
the C block compared to only 30 in the AB blocks and 155 in the DEF blocks.1 Furthermore, there
were two licenses for sale for every geographic region in the AB blocks, and three licenses for every
geographic region in the DEFblocks. An ABor DEFblock bidder was thus guaranteed to be competing
directly against at least one other winning carrier after the auction ended. This complicates the analysis
of bidding behavior considerably. In the C block, each geographic region had only one license for sale.2
The C block auction took 184 rounds, lasting from December 1995 to April 1996. By issuing
discounts to small businesses, the FCC effectively allowed only qualiﬁed entrepreneurs to bid.3 This
policy fulﬁlled a Congressional mandate to encourage smaller companies to offer wireless phone ser-
vice. Bidding for the C block was more aggressive than in the AB block, with bids (for only half the
spectrum sold in the AB blocks) totaling $10.1 billion. Figure 1 is a map of the licenses won by the
Top 12 winning bidders. Figure 1 shows that the largest winner in the C block auction was NextWave,
which spent a total of $4.2 billion for 56 licenses, including close to $1 billion for the New York City
license.
Bidders were given an extended payment plan of 10 years. Many of the bidders planned to secure
1Moreover, many of the bidders in the AB and DEF blocks were incumbent mobile phone carriers, and for antitrust
reasons were ineligible to bid in geographic markets where they already held licenses. In particular, parties owning more
than a 40% interest in an existing wireless license in an area could not bid on another license in that area. Imposing the legal
choice set of each bidder creates considerable additional complexity in estimation.
The C block, by comparison, featured only potential new entrants, so all bidders could potentially bid on all licenses. This
policy may have lowered competition in the AB auction (Ausubel et al., 1997; Salant, 1997). The FCC limited any one bidder
from winning more than 98 total licenses in the C and F entrepreneurs blocks. Only NextWave came close to meeting this
limit. Ausubel et al. (1997) point out that because the limit was in total licenses rather than total population, NextWave had
incentives to purchase licenses with the highest total population.
2After the auction, winning C block bidders were much more likely to compete against incumbent mobile phone carriers
operating in the same geographic region than against other C block bidders.
3Plans to give additional advantages to women and minorities were dropped because of litigation. Small business owner-
ship requirements were not overly strict. Two ownerships structures qualify bidders as small businesses. The ﬁrst structure is
a control group must hold 25% of the businesses’ equity. Of that 25%, 15% (or 3/5) of the equity must be held by qualifying
entrepreneurs. Of the remaining 75% of equity, no more than 25% can be controlled by any one entity. An alternative struc-
ture says the control group can be 50% of equity, with 30% being entrepreneurs. This allows the other 50% to be held by one
outside entity, which in effect allows the company to partner with a major ﬁrm. The most famous case of partnering is Cook
Inlet, an Alaskan native corporation that partnered with the incumbent carrier Western Wireless.
5outside funding for both their license bids and other carrier startup costs after the auction. Securing
licenses ﬁrst and ﬁnancing later was an extremely important part of the business plan of what was until
the late 1990s the most successful American mobile phone carrier, McCaw Cellular.4 McCaw grew
from a regional cable provider to a multi-billion dollar mobile phone carrier by purchasing licenses
and then using the licenses as collateral to secure loans. This strategy was based on McCaw’s (cor-
rect) forecast of the revenue potential in mobile phones, which was higher than the forecasts of larger
companies (Murray, 2001). It is possible that many of the C block bidders were trying to recreate
McCaw’s strategy. Without a license, a C block bidder is not necessarily a serious negotiating partner
for ﬁnanciers. With a scarce license, a small business bidder becomes a relevant player in the mobile
phone industry, and can expect to hold serious discussions with ﬁnanciers.
Compared to McCaw, the C block winners did not have an early-mover advantage. As it turns out,
many C block winners were unable to meet their ﬁnancial obligations to the FCC. These new carriers
were unable to secure enough outside funding to both operate a mobile phone company and pay back
the FCC. Many C block winners returned their licenses to the FCC, where they were re-auctioned.
Others companies merged with with larger carriers (forming a large part of the licenses held by T-
Mobile USA, for example), or were able to protect their licenses in bankruptcy court. NextWave is
the most famous case of bankruptcy protection. NextWave was eventually able to settle with the FCC,
and sell some of its licenses to other carriers for billions of dollars. Ex-post, the C block bidders, who
were accused of bidding too aggressively at the time, underpredicted the eventual market value of the
licenses. However, much of this value was to larger carriers, not small business entrants who could not
secure the ﬁnancing to operate as a mobile phone carrier. In 2004, only a few C block winners, such as
GWI/MetroPCS, remain true independent carriers marketing service under their own brand.
The resale and merger activity suggests that a bidder’s post-auction value for winning licenses was
not only a function of the number of customers it planned to serve as a mobile phone carrier. Valuations
might be a function of the bidder’s beliefs about the expected value from resale of its licenses and the
risk of bankruptcy.5 Therefore, attempting to directly recover a bidder’s value from operating a mobile
phone carrier will be quite naive in this setting. We will favor a more nuanced interpretation of the
estimates from our structural model. In addition, it is important to allow for an econometric approach
that allows for unobserved heterogeneity from omitted license attributes, such as the anticipated re-
sale value. The estimator that we propose is designed to accommodate a reasonably general form of
unobserved heterogeneity.
2.2 Auction Rules and Bidder Characteristics
Similar rules govern all FCC auctions for mobile phone spectrum. Each auction operates using an
ascending bid, simultaneous-close format. In other words, each auction lasts multiple rounds, where in
4McCaw was purchased by AT&T for $17.4 billion and renamed AT&T Wireless in 1993. AT&T Wireless was itself
purchased by Cingular in 2004.
5The FCC’s unjust enrichment regulation penalizes resale to carriers that do not qualify as eligible entrepreneurs.
6each round all licenses are available for bidding. During a round, bidding on all licenses closes at the
same time. Simultaneous bidding allows bidders to assemble a useful package of licenses from those
available, without the risk of a necessary license to complete a package being unavailable because of
an early close. These auction rules were explicitly designed to allow bidders to assemble packages
exhibiting complementarities, while letting the bidders themselves and not the FCC determine where
the true complementarities lie.
Each bidder pays an upfront amount of money for eligibility. A bidder’s eligibility is expressed
in units of total population. A bidder cannot bid on a package of licenses that exceeds the bidder’s
eligibility. For example, a bidder who pays to be eligible for 100 million people cannot bid on licenses
that cover geographic areas that together contain more than 100 million residents. Eligibility cannot
be increased after the auction starts. The eligibility payments were 1.5 cents per MHz-individual in a
hypothetical license for the C block. Compared to the closing auction prices, these payments are trivial.
From an empirical point of view, eligibility payments provide early evidence on a bidder’s willingness
to devote ﬁnancial resources towards winning a large number of spectrum licenses. Because estimation
requires at least one observable bidder characteristic, this paper does not consider strategic motives
(such as intimidating rivals) for choosing eligibility levels.6
Table 1 lists characteristics of the 85 winning and 170 non-winning bidders in the continental
United States.7 The average winning bidder paid fees to be eligible to bid on licenses covering 10
million people, while the average losing bidder was eligible to bid on licenses covering only 5 million
people. Bidders also had to submit ﬁnancial disclosure forms (the FCC’s Form 175) in order to qualify
as entrepreneurs for the C block, which was limited to new entrants only. Here we see that the ﬁnancial
characteristics of winners and non-winners are similar, which leads us to believe that these disclosure
forms didnot represent thetrue resources ofbidders. Inour structural estimator, weuse initial eligibility
as an individual bidder characteristic instead of assets or revenues.
Table 1 lists the mean number of licenses bid on and won by winners and non-winners. On average,
a winning bidder won 5 licenses and entered at least one bid on 39 licenses. Although not listed in the
table, the top 15 winning bidders, in terms of number of licenses, were active bidders on many licenses.
The top 15 winners won an average of 16 licenses and bid on an average of 123 (out of 493) licenses.8
Most of the major winners and some of the non-winners were investors operating on a national scale.
The role for idiosyncratic valuations of licenses due to local knowledge seems relatively low, as the
6The FCC is concerned with concluding the auction in a reasonable amount of time. Therefore, each bidder is required
to make a certain number of bids, in terms of population, to prevent losing some of its eligibility. As the rounds progress,
information is revealed about the demands of other bidders, and bidders drop their activity levels to an amount corresponding
to the licenses they hope to win. By the close of the auction, a bidder’s eligibility is generally only slightly higher than the
licenses it wins.
7The C block also contains licenses for Alaska and Hawaii as well as Puerto Rico and several other island territories of
the United States. The potential for complementarities between these licenses and licenses in the continental United States
seems limited, so we restrict attention to the contiguous 48 states.
8One of the losing bidders submitted bids on all BTAs. This bidder withdrew from the auction because it felt that the
prices were too high for its business plan.
7bidding in the C block auction was dominated by national investors that were competing for licenses
over the entire country.
2.3 Did the Auction Produce a Functioning Market?
In this section, we show that despite the many potential complications and the lack of solved theo-
retical models for this class of dynamic games, the C block auction generated closing bids where the
underlying characteristics of licenses explain much of the variation in prices across licenses.
The most important characteristic of a license is the number of people living in it, who represent
potential subscribers to mobile phone service. Figure 2 shows the winning bids by the population of
the license, along with a ﬁtted regression line. The slope of the regression line is $52.7. For the most
part, the large population licenses, such as New York and Los Angeles, are only a little above or below
the regression line.
Figure 2 is slightly misleading because most of the markets have fewer than ﬁve million residents,
and are clumped together at the left-hand side of the ﬁgure. Figure 3 plots the winning bid per resident
(instead of the total bid as before) for licenses with fewer than ﬁve million people. Here we see the
mean winning bid per resident is well below $52.7, so that the implicit price of a resident is larger in
especially large markets. Figure 3 shows that the ﬁnal price per resident of more populated licenses
is in fact greater. For example, there are no licenses with more than 1 million residents where the
closing bid price is less than $20. This pattern of higher prices for larger licenses could be driven by
other license characteristics (such as demographics), but is also consistent with increasing returns to
operating scale in mobile phone carrier operation. Returns to operating scale create complementarities
across licenses, as one way to increase scale is to win more licenses.
Figure 4 shows a map of the price per resident of licenses in the continental United States. Many
of the licenses that sell for above $47 contain major metropolitan areas, such as Atlanta, Los Angeles,
New York, Chicago, Dallas or Minneapolis. These major areas have dense population areas, which
require fewer cellular towers per potential customer to serve. Ausubel et al. (1997) use proprietary
consulting data on the population density of the expected build-out areas for C block mobile phone
service. They have provided us the same data, which we plot in a US map in Figure 5. There seems
to be positive correlation between the price per resident in Figure 4 and the population density of the
buildout area in Figure 5. Indeed, the correlation between the two measures at the license level is 0.570.
Table 2 lists characteristics of winning packages. Only licenses in the continental United States
are included in packages in Table 2. The average winning bidder agreed to pay $116 million and won
a license covering 2.9 million people. The largest winner, NextWave, bid $4.2 billion for a package
covering 94 million people. As discussed above, the major characteristic predicting the closing bid
price of a license is the population of that license. It follows quite naturally that the income level of the
potential customers in that license could also be a major determination of price. We use the percentage
of households with incomes greater than $35,000 as our measure of package income. By this measure,
8the mean percentage of high income households in winning packages is 46%.9
2.4 Suggestive Evidence on Complementarities
Many aspects of the design of the FCC spectrum auctions focus on the possibility that a package of
licenses might be worth more than the sum of the values of the licenses if won by different bidders.
Licenses with these properties exhibit complementarities (synergies).
Before looking at the auction results, one’s prior might be that complementarities are not important
in the spectrum auctions. The FCC chooses market boundaries to be in sparsely settled areas in order
to minimize complementarities across markets. Furthermore, 1900 MHz PCS wireless phone service
is mainly deployed in urban areas and along major highways, so there might not even be PCS service
along the boundaries of two markets.10 Finally, companies can coordinate with contracts (roaming
agreements) if the same company does not own the adjacent licenses.11
Researchers examining the auction results have generally concluded that complementarities were
important. The map of the Top 12 winners (by the number of licenses) in Figure 1 shows several
bidders win licenses in markets adjacent to each other.12 For example, NextWave, the largest winner,
purchases clumps of adjacent licenses in different areas of the country. GWI/MetroPCS ﬁts the cluster
pattern well, winning licenses in the greater San Francisco, Atlanta and Miami areas.
On the other hand, the majority of winning bidders won only a few licenses. Figure 1 emphasizes
this by also plotting the 26 licenses in the continental United States that were the only license won by
their winning bidders. We calculate that only 20 out of 89 C block winning bidders won packages of
licenses where the population in adjacent licenses within the package was more than 1 million.13 Aer
Force is the prime example of a Top 12 bidder that did not seem overly concerned with complemen-
tarities. Figure 1 shows that Aer Force won 12 licenses in the continental United States, but that none
of them are adjacent to each other. From the maps alone, it appears some winning bidders cared more
about geographic complementarities than others.
Salant (1997), a consultant during the AB blocks auction for GTE, provides an insider’s take on
9The cutoff level of household income of $35,000 is the same measure used in Ausubel et al. (1997). Magazine articles
from that mid-1990s show that the level of penetration of mobile phones into lower-income groups that we see in 2004 was
not predicted by many analysts, who considered higher-income groups to be the main market for mobile phones.
10To some extent, PCS licenses are primarily built out in urban areas because the FCC requires build outs to cover a certain
fraction of the population of the market, rather than a fraction of the market’s land area. 800 MHz carriers tend to cover both
urban and rural areas because the FCC requires coverage as a large fraction of the land area of those licenses.
11The Coase Theorem suggests that, in a frictionless world, such contracts will implement the efﬁcient outcome. Our paper
uses revealed preference to investigate whether bidders thought the Coase Theorem would be operative in the post-auction
mobile phone service industry.
12Ausubel et al.(1997) study inpart the earlier AB auction and show several bidders win licenses adjacent to markets where
the bidder is a mobile phone incumbent, or a landline telephone carrier. For example, Paciﬁc Bell, at the time a California
telephone company, won AB block licenses in California. Other bidders, such as the forerunners of Sprint PCS and AT&T
Wireless, embarked on a strategy of winning licenses in as many markets as allowed.
13This complementarity measure is calculated over pairs of licenses. If a license is adjacent to two others in a package,
its population will be counted twice. The 89 winners include four bidders who won licenses only outside of the continental
United States.
9bidder valuations. GTEdid value complementarities, in that it wanted to acquire licenses in areas where
it was a landline phone company, and in areas that would ﬁll in holes in its existing wireless phone
network. GTE was unwilling to bid on certain potentially lucrative licenses, such as Los Angeles,
because GTE felt it would not be proﬁtable to win such an expensive license.
Ausubel, Cramton, McAfeeand McMillan (1997) and Moreton and Spiller (1998) examine whether
adjacent licenses exhibited complementarities by regressing the log of winning bids on market and
bidder characteristics. Ausubel et al. study the AB and C block auctions and ﬁndthat the log of winning
bids are positively related to whether the runner-up bidders won adjacent licenses, as one might expect
in an ascending-bid auction. Moreton and Spiller have better measures of incumbency, and also ﬁnd
that winning bids are positively related to the runner-up bidder’s measures of complementarities. The
results are the most statistically signiﬁcant for the C block auction.14
The previous authors also mention global complementarities or increasing returns to scale, the
notion that a wireless network involves ﬁxed costs that can be spread out among more customers in a
larger carrier. We prefer the term operating scale economies for this concept. Scale economies can be
represented as a valuation convex in package characteristics such as total population.
3 An Empirical Model of Spectrum Auctions
In this section, we propose an empirical model of bidding for spectrum licenses. FCC spectrum auc-
tions are ascending-bid, multiple round auctions that can take more than a hundred days to complete.
Formally speaking, a spectrum auction is a dynamic game, potentially with incomplete information.
If bidders have ﬁnite valuations, they will cease bidding after a ﬁnite number of rounds, although the
length of the auction is not known at the start.15
3.1 Basic Notation
We index rounds by t. There are a = 1,...,N bidders who compete to win licenses i = 1,...,L. In the C
block auction, N is 255 and L is 493. An FCC spectrum auction is a multiple unit auction and therefore
bidders can submit bids on multiple licenses. While bidders submit bids on only individual licenses
(there is no package bidding), a bidder is concerned about the package, or collection, of licenses it
wins. We let pat (S) denote the vector of the bids submitted for the package of licenses S by bidder a in
round t.
Ascending auctions differ from other dynamic games because a bidder’s ﬁnal payoff is based only
upon the package it wins at the end of the auction, and the price paid for that package. Label a generic
14Ausubel et al. and Moreton and Spiller do not claim their price regressions correspond to hedonic estimates of bidder
valuations. Rather, they specify descriptive or in-sample prediction regressions designed to summarize facts about the closing
bid prices.
15The FCC gave itself reserve powers to end the auction if the normal course of bidding failed to do so. As these powers
were not used, we do not model them.




where piT is the closing price for a license i in the package S. The term pa(S) is bidder a’s valuation
for the licenses in S. If a plans on marketing mobile phone services using these licenses then pa(S)
would be equal to a’s expected proﬁts. Instead if a intends to resell the licenses or merge with a
larger company, then pa(S) would represent the anticipated resale value of the licenses. Our broad
interpretation of pa(S) is consistent with our discussion in Section 2.1, as there may be diverse factors
that enter into a bidder’s valuation.
The payoff function is additively separable in prices, which makes sense if we view the bidders as
proﬁt maximizers. We do not impose that pa(S) is additively separable in the license characteristics.
Indeed, a notion of complementarities is that, for licenses i and j,
pa({i, j}) > pa({i})+pa({j}),
or that the value of two licenses purchased together exceeds the sum of the valuations of the licenses if
purchased separately. Obviously this violates additive separability.
At each round t, we denote the vector of state variables as st. At round t, st will include the highest
bid and the identity of the highest bidder for each of the L licenses. Newly submitted bids must exceed
the previous high bid by a certain minimum bid increment. If a bidder is currently the highest bidder on
a license, without any action to withdraw the bidder remains the high bidder. The state space at t +1,
st+1, is st including the new highest bids and bidders for licenses that had activity during round t.
The state space also includes a vector of bidder eligibilities. At round t, each bidder has an eligibil-
ity level, measured in the total population of licenses in a bidder’s package. The sum of the population
of licenses for a bidder’s current highest bids and its new bids must be less than its eligibility. In order
to speed the conclusion of the auction, the FCC reduces the eligibility of bidders that do not submit
enough bids. The state space thus can be extended to include the vector of remaining eligibilities of all
N bidders. The initial eligibility level is purchased by a bidder before the beginning of the auction.16
Certain Nash equilibria in a dynamic game may involve strategic interaction between players. In
collusive equilibria, bidders enter special bids to signal to each other the licenses they are most inter-
ested in winning. Under collusion, bidders react to bid signals, so the history of past bids should also
be included in the state space.
3.2 Assumptions for Efﬁciency
Milgrom (2000) proves that under two major assumptions a simultaneous ascending auction is equiva-
lent to a tatonnement process that ﬁnds a competitive equilibrium of the economy. By the ﬁrst welfare
16No one bidder can win more than 98 licenses between the C and F block entrepreneurial spectrum auctions.
11theorem and the assumption that prices enter payoffs quasilinearly, the ﬁnal assignment of licenses to
bidders maximizes the total value in the economy. The outcome of the auction can then be analyzed as
a two-sided matching (Shapley and Shubik, 1972) market where the two sides of the market are bidders
and licenses, and the vector of license prices clears the market.
The two main assumptions that Milgrom’s efﬁciency theorem requires are
1. The licenses are mutual substitutes for all bidders, and
2. All bidders bid straightforwardly.
Unfortunately, neither one of the assumptions needed to prove that a simultaneous ascending auction
is efﬁcient appear to hold in the C block data.
For our purposes, if licenses are mutual substitutes they are not complements. The fact that many
bidders win clusters of licenses, as seen in the map in Figure 1, is good evidence that licenses may not
be mutual substitutes for all bidders. Other suggestive evidence on complementarities is discussed in
Section 2.4.
Bidding straightforwardly means that a bidder submits new bids each period in order to maximize
its payoffs, equation (1). One violation of straightforward bidding is jump bidding. When making a
jump bid, a bidder enters a bid that exceeds the FCC’s minimum bid for that round. Figure 3 shows
that there was a non-trivial level of jump bidding during the C block auction. We deﬁne a jump bid to
be any bid that is 2.5% greater than the FCC’s minimum bid for that license and round.
When jump bidding, a bidder risks the chance that the jump bid will exceed the valuation of rival
bidders, and be the ﬁnal price. A jump bidder always has a nonzero probability of overpaying for a
license.17
There are strategic reasons why abidder might jump bid. Avery (1998) studies an ascending auction
of a single item. Bidders have afﬁliated values and therefore a fear of the winner’s curse, or paying too
much for an item of uncertain true value. A jump bid of a signiﬁcant amount can be a credible signal,
as in expected value the jump bidder incurs a cost that the jump bid may be the ﬁnal bid and close the
auction at a price above the outcome from straightforward bidding. After signalling the jump bidder’s
aggressive intentions, other bidders may discontinue bidding, as they suspect that the winner after more
bidding will overpay and suffer negative proﬁts from the winner’s curse.18
The multiple items sold in spectrum auctions give new opportunities for implicit collusion through
repeated interaction and multi-market contact. Brusco and Lopomo (2002) present a theoretical model
17Daniel and Hirshleifer (1998) study a model of an ascending auction of a single item where bidding is costly. An
equilibrium involves jump bidding to speed the conclusion of the auction. As bids in the C block auction totalled $10.1
billion, it is unlikely that bidders had a high opportunity cost of time and placed jump bids to speed the conclusion of the
auction. Serious bidders employed teams of professionals to manage bidding activity.
18Theorists have shown that jump bidding can happen for non-collusive reasons. For example, in a simultaneous ascending
auction where the bidding on each license can close at different times, which is not the FCC’s rule, Zhèng (2005) shows that
jump bidding can alleviate the exposure problem mentioned below. As we discuss below, the FCC auction rules have a more
direct withdrawal mechanism to mitigate the exposure problem.
12speciﬁcally designed to focus on collusion and complementarities in simultaneous ascending auctions.
In a simultaneous ascending auction, there exist equilibria where bidders divide the items for sale
amongst themselves. At the beginning of the auction, bidders enter bids to signal their preferred li-
censes. Then no colluding bidders place bids on items they are not designated to win in the collusive
equilibrium. Bidders each win a small handful of items, but win them at very low prices and make a
larger proﬁt than through straightforward bidding. The collusive equilibrium is supported by the threat
of reverting to straightforward bidding. The collusive outcome is not efﬁcient, because the items are
not necessarily assigned to the bidder with the highest valuation, and licenses with strong complemen-
tarities are not necessarily won by the same bidder. The signal in Brusco and Lopomo (2002) is a
positive bid on a handful of licenses in the initial round, but not necessarily a jump bid. The logic in
Avery (1998) suggests jump bids could be an effective signal, however.19 20
Figure 3 shows jump bidding was prevalent towards the beginning of the auction, where the risk of
overpaying is much lower. The number of total new bids dramatically slowed during the second half
of the auction, and this slowdown is especially severe for jump bids. The presence of jump bids might
represent attempts at intimidation, but jump bids are not evidence that intimidation was particularly ef-
fective. Attempts to collude may still have had serious implications for the ﬁnal assignment of licenses
to bidders, however. In our structural model, we will estimate whether bidder continuation values are a
function of jump bids by rival bidders.
3.3 The Value Function
Multiple theoretical models have been proposed to study spectrum auctions. While each of these mod-
els gives us some insight into the incentives that bidders face, they offer potentially conﬂicting conclu-
sions. Also, there is no consensus among theorists about the “correct” model of bidding in spectrum
auctions. Therefore, it is highly desirable that an estimator does not require imposing a speciﬁc model
of dynamic equilibrium (e.g. Milgrom (2000) or Brusco and Lopomo (2002)).
Given the diversity of models, we would like an estimator that allows us to learn which of several
competing models might be most reasonable. The estimation approach that wepropose is in the spirit of
Haile and Tamer (2003) in that we try to only impose weak conditions of equilibrium that are required
to hold in a wide range of models. As we describe below, the main condition that we will impose is the
requirement that the continuation value from the observed actions exceeds the continuation value from
19Brusco and Lopomo also mention that complementarities might break implicit collusion. Counterintuitively, it is not the
level of complementarities that prevents collusion, but the variability of complementarities across bidders.
Brusco and Lopomo (2002) discuss other reasons why collusion might fail. Having too many bidders relative to the number
of items makes it harder tosupport a collusive equilibrium, as bidders not winning an itemhave no incentive to collude. Initial
rounds of aggressive bidding might be needed to weed out bidders with low valuations in order to narrow down the remaining
bidders into a implicitly colluding coalition.
20The collusive concerns described by Brusco and Lopomo (2002) applies to auctions of multiple discrete heterogeneous
items. Ausubel andCramton(2002) ﬁndarelatedresult forsealed-bid (non-ascending, oneshot) auctions of multipleidentical
items, such as electricity or treasury bonds. With multiple identical items, bidders usually have an incentive to shade their
bids on marginal units to earn greater proﬁts by paying a lower per-unit charge on inframarginal units.
13actions that are not chosen at the end of the auction.21
In a pure-strategy, subgame perfect Bayes-Nash equilibrium of a simultaneous ascending auction,
bidders maximize expected discounted payoffs at every state in the game tree. Payoffs are computed
by taking expectations about the probability of reaching the various terminal nodes of the game tree as
a function of bidder a’s own strategy and the strategies of other players. In particular, at any state st,
bidder a has a continuation value, or Bellman equation,
Vat (st,S) = max
pat(S)
0+E[Vat+1(st+1,S) | pat (S)].
We write “0+”to emphasize that there is no current-period payoff in an auction.22 The expectation in
the continuation value is taken knowing the optimal decision rule of bidder a at state st, pat (S), which
is just the pat (S) that maximizes E[Vat+1(S) | pat (S)].23
The new state, st+1, evolves according to the submitted bids of all players. The uncertainty is over
the distribution of future bids of other agents in the auction.24 At a Nash equilibrium, the strategies of
all bidders as a function of the unknown private information are known. For an individual bidder, the
strategies of rivals are subsumed into the expectation operator.
In the data, the auction ended at some round we call T. Revealed preference implies that if a is the




∀ S′ ⊇ S. (2)
At the end of the auction, bids move very slowly and bidders do not submit bids much above the
minimum required to be the highest bidder on a particular license. Therefore, we simplify a bidder’s
choice at the end of the auction to be the set of licenses that it wishes to be the high bidder on. We let
VaT (sT,S′) be the continuation value that a receives from entering new bids to create a new package S′
at the end of the auction. Revealed preference implies that the continuation value from the package of
licenses that a won was superior to superset packages of licenses S′ that a could have bid on.
The goal of our estimator will be to recover VaT (sT,S). We will not attempt to recover the post-
auction valuations pa(S). If we abstracted away from strategic behavior at the end of the auction
so that bidders did not fear retaliation or other reactions from competitors, then we would have that
VaT (sT,S) = pa(S)−åi∈S piT. This is because bidders should simply bid on their most preferred
licenses at the end of the auction, subject to eligibility rules, if there are no strategic interactions.
21Haile and Tamer (2003) estimate bidder payoffs in private value auctions of asingle good. The Haileand Tamer estimator
is based in part off of the assumption that no bidder will let another win the good at a price below the ﬁrst bidder’s valuation
of the good. This assumption of mostly straightforward bidding on all licenses is much less tenable in a multiple unit auction,
where the fact that all bidders can bid on all licenses means that intimidation is real possibility.
22We ignore discounting, or impatience to end the auction.
23The set of licenses where new bids are entered must satisfy the eligibility rules.
24Alternatively, a rival bidder might be playing a mixing strategy, although we do not allow for mixed strategies in estima-
tion.
14Making this assumption, however, would make us unable to test for collusive behavior or other sources
of inefﬁciency.
3.4 Our Continuation Value Identiﬁcation Strategy
We use the revealed preferences of bidders at the end of an auction to identify continuation values. We
make the following assumption.
Assumption 1. The equilibrium bids in the ﬁnal period of the auction are in pure strategies.
The assumption of pure strategies is crucial for our estimator. If the bidding at the end of the auction
is in mixed strategies, the bidders might have ex post regret. That is, if other players are randomizing,
player a’s bids are a best response to its equilibrium beliefs about the distribution of other players’
strategies, which would invalidate the revealed preference inequality in equation (2). Ciliberto and
Tamer (2003) discuss ex-post regret in related problems.
In addition, we will make the following assumption:





∀ a, S′  = Sa. (3)
Assumption 2 states that a bidder’s continuation value for its winning package is greater than its
continuation value for any other package, at the realized ﬁnal state of the game. This includes packages
that may violate the eligibility rules of the auction. In principle we could incorporate the eligibility
rules into our estimation strategy. However, this would be at the cost of increasing the computational
complexity of programming our estimator. Further, imposing eligibility constraints would limit the
empirical content of revealed preferences, as it is likely that a bidder with a high continuation value for
another license would have bid on that license 10, 20 or 50 rounds before the end of the auction. As
bidding slowed down at the end of the auction, we believe it is reasonable to assume that giving bidders
additional eligibility would not have changed behavior very much if at all.
Assumption 2 also rules out the exposure problem that can arise from complementarities. In the
exposure problem, a bidder places a bid on a package of licenses with signiﬁcant complementarities,
but eventually only wins a subset of the licenses. If the total package payoffs are dominated by the
complementarities, the bidder may end up overpaying for the licenses it does win. We rule out the
exposure problem because we think it is not a major issue in this auction because the FCC’s auction
rules allow a bidder to withdraw a standing high bid. When the bidder withdraws a standing high bid,
the bidder is potentially liable for a penalty equal to the difference between the withdrawn bid and
the ﬁnal closing price of the license. If the withdrawn bid is lower than the eventual closing price,
15the bidder faces no penalty.25 Penalties in the C block option were not large. The median maximum
potential penalty, the penalty if no other bidders entered new bids on that license after a withdrawal,
was $93,530. Because almost all licenses had higher bids posted after a withdrawal, only around $5
million in penalties were eventually paid after the auction ended, a relatively small amount compared
to the $10.1 billion in winning bids. The largest penalty was faced by a bidder who added an extra “0”
to the end of its bid by mistake.
Sixteen different bidders used the withdrawal option. Those sixteen bidders withdrew a total of
ﬁfty bids on individual licenses during the C block auction, representing 0.17% of the 29,865 bids
entered during the 184 rounds of the auction. Seven bids were withdrawn in the ﬁrst round. There
is some evidence that those withdrawing bids had made many unsuccessful bids at the same time as
the withdrawn bid. Bidders submitted an average of twenty bids the round a withdrawn bid was ﬁrst
entered and the bidders were the highest bidder after that round on an average of three licenses. This is
consistent with the withdrawal option being used to mitigate an exposure problem. With so little use of
the withdrawal option, probably few bidders were stuck with licenses they preferred not to win at the
closing prices.
The summary of this discussion is that Assumption 2 is motivated by revealed preference. Ifbidders
would have higher continuation values from more bidding, to a ﬁrst approximation they should have
done so. If bidders were standing high bidders on the wrong licenses, they would face low penalties
from withdrawing, and should have done so.
3.5 Combinatorics of Auction Outcomes
The revealed preference inequality in equation (3) forms the basis for our estimator of continuation
values. Even this simple inequality presents immense computational challenges to estimation. The
total number of packages that could be won by an individual bidder in the C block auction includes
all subsets of the 493 licenses with 98 or fewer total licenses. There are 3.58x10105 such packages.26
Therefore, the number of packages that could be won by a bidder is larger than the number of atoms
in the universe.27Any estimation method that requires evaluating the revealed preference inequalities
at all possible packages will be infeasible. This dimensionality problem will motivate our estimation
approach which we describe in detail in Section 5.
25Cramton and Schwartz (2000) suggest that the withdrawal rule may be another tool for implicit collusion. A bidder can
submit a bid on a rival bidder’s license to signal to the rival that punishment is forthcoming if the rival doesn’t cease bidding
on another license. Then the signalling bid is withdrawn, leaving little risk to the original bidder.
26The power set of all packages, ignoring the FCC’s rule of no more than 98 licenses per package, has size 2493 =
2.557x10148.
27Physicists estimate that the total number of atoms in the universe ranges from 1079 to 1081, clearly a good deal fewer
than the 3.58x10105 packages in the C block auction.
164 Empirical Proxies for Attempted Collusion and Complementarities
This section focuses on an intuitive discussion of identiﬁcation of continuation values in the C block
spectrum auction, by relating observed variables to the economic questions about collusion and com-
plementarities outlined in the introduction. All of the following observables enter as covariates into our
parameterizations of continuation values.
4.1 Jump Bids as Proxies for Attempted Intimidation
Brusco and Lopomo (2002) suggest that there are many collusive equilibria in an ascending bid auc-
tion. Cramton and Schwartz (2000) and Cramton and Schwartz (2002) document cases of intimidation
in spectrum auctions, particularly in the AB and DEF block auctions. Our strategy for investigating
the possibility of intimidation is to parameterize continuation values as functions of observable proxies
for intimidation. Jump bidding is our main proxy for potential intimidation. A bidder bidding straight-
forwardly would enter a bid equal to no higher than the minimum bid, in the hope that the minimum
bid exceeds the valuation of rival bidders. A non-strategic bidder loses nothing by always bidding the
minimum bid when his valuation for the license exceeds the minimum bid.
Deﬁnitively establishing collusion using bid data is extremely difﬁcult. We will be able to deter-
mine whether jump bids on licenses early in the auction generated lower continuation values for those
licenses at the end of the auction. Even if this is true, given how little is understood about the equi-
librium to spectrum auction games, one should be cautious in interpreting this evidence as deﬁnitive
proof of collusion. However, if the impact of jump bids on the valuations is large, auction designers
might wish to consider whether the potential for intimidation could be alleviated through an improved
licensing scheme.
Table 3 lists statistics for the population-weighted mean numbers of jump bids for the 85 winning
packages. A typical license in a package has 2.6 jump bids submitted by non-winning bidders over
the course of the auction. Although not listed in the table, ﬁve of the 85 winning packages have no
jump bids entered by rival bidders at all. One winning package, which consists of the single license for
Milwaukee, has ﬁfteen jump bids by rival bidders.28
4.2 Proxies for Potential Complementarities
The FCC’s simultaneous ascending auction is designed to allow bidders to assemble a package of li-
censes with complementarities. Mobile phones are a network good with substantial ﬁxed costs, such as
providing customer service, marketing, and the development and implementation of new technologies.
On the demand side, mobile phone users may wish to use their phone in geographic locations other
than their home area, and may value carriers that have greater coverage areas. We measure the impor-
28In the empirical application, when calculating the continuation value for a given bidder and package combination, we
always remove the jump bids made by that bidder on licenses in that package.
17tance of economies of operating scale and geographic scope in continuation values by collecting data
on variables that proxy for potential complementarities.
Our main method of estimating the size of economies of operating scale is including a quadratic
terms in population into continuation value functions. The main package characteristic a mobile phone
carrier cares about is the total population of the licenses in the package. If the coefﬁcient on the
square of population is positive, then valuations are convex in total population, and it appears likely
that bidders value operating scale economies. In other words, they have increasing returns to scale. If
instead the coefﬁcient on the square of population is negative, then continuation values are concave in
population, and it appears that there are decreasing returns to operating scale.
For mobile phone carriers, geographic scope economies arise when serving related markets makes
the total proﬁt from serving those markets greater than than the total proﬁts if separate companies
served each market. We use three proxies for geographic scope, in order to examine the robustness of
our estimates to different measures.29
Our ﬁrst proxy for geographic scope is based on the geographic distance between pairs of licenses









where population is measured in millions and distance is measured in kilometers. This measure is
just the population-weighted mean across licenses of the number of other residents, divided by their
distances.31 Table 4 shows sample statistics on the geographic complementarities for the 85 winning
packages. Counting the population-weighted means over all the pairwise combinations of licenses in
a package, licenses in the 85 winning packages have a mean 6 million (0.006 1000) pairwise com-
binations of residents in different markets a normalized distance of 1000 km (620 miles) from each
other.
29The previous literature emphasizes the geographic adjacency of two markets. Visually, geographic adjacency is inter-
esting because it is evident from looking at a map of winning bids that some bidders purchase clusters of adjacent licenses.
However, in the western United States many markets are geographically adjacent only because large regions of desert have
been added to the corresponding geographic markets. Adjacency says, for example, that the Reno license is next to Los
Angeles license, while those two cities are actually 615 km apart. Our population-weighted centroid measure says the Reno
license is 510 km away from the Los Angeles license. Note that the previous descriptive empirical work only considered
observed winning packages, and as Reno and Los Angeles were won by different bidders, this example is not relevant for
their analysis.
30We measure distance between two licenses using the population-weighted centroid of each license. The population-
weighted centroid is calculated using a rasterized smoothing procedure using county-level population data from the US
Census Bureau.
31This geographic complementarity proxy can be motivated as follows. Consider a mobile phone user in a home market i.
That mobile phone user potentially wants to use his phone in all other markets. He is more likely to use his phone if there
are more people to visit, so his visit rate is increasing in the population of the other license, j. The user is less likely to visit
j if j is far from his home market i, so we divide by the distance between i and j. We care about all users equally, so we
multiply the representative user in i’s travel experience by the population of i. Finally, we want an average rather than a total
measure as we already include total population as a measure of operating scale in continuation valuation. Therefore, we take
the population-weighted mean by dividing by the total population in the package.
18Geographic measures of distance may not capture the returns to scope that carriers are concerned
about. Mobile phone customers may travel by means other than ground transportation. For example,
many business users travel by air between Los Angeles and New York. In fact, the C block bidder
NextWave won both the New York and Los Angeles licenses. In addition, distance is not the only
factor affecting even ground travel.
We have two complementarity proxies based upon travel between two licenses. The ﬁrst measure,
from the 1995 American Travel Survey (ATS), is proportionate to the number of trips longer than 100
km between major cities. All forms of transportation are covered. The downside of this measure is that
for privacy reasons the ATS does not provide enough information about rural origin and destinations
to tie rural areas to particular mobile phone licenses. Our second measure, from the Airline Origin and
Destination Survey for the calendar year 1994, is the projected number of passengers ﬂying between
two mobile phone license areas.32 The drawback of the air travel measure is that it assumes all pas-
sengers stay in the mobile phone license area where their destination airport is located.33 Both travel






trips(origin is i,destination is j),
where our ATS measure uses the count of raw trips in the survey, and the air travel count is inﬂated
to approximate the total number of trips during 1994.34 The ATS data in Table 4 show a license in a
wining package has a mean of 53.2 trips between a license and the other licenses in the package. The
airline data show a typical license has 26,100 plane trips a year between that license and others in the
same winning package.
For all geographic scope proxies, some fraction of the winning packages has a value of 0. For
example, 26 out of the 85 winning packages contain only one license in the continental United States.
Therefore, looking at only the actions of a few large carriers may distort one’s impression of how
important scope economies are. The fact that singleton packages are observed suggests that other
factors inﬂuence wireless industry structure.
32Intermediate stops are not counted for either dataset. For both datasets, geographic information software (GIS) was used
to match origins and destinations with mobile phone licenses. For airports, the origin and destination license areas are easy
to calculate. For the MSAs (Metropolitan Statistical Areas) used in the ATS, the equivalent C block license area was found
using the centroid of the origin or destination MSA. The C block license boundaries for urban areas roughly follow MSAs.
33We effectively code that there are zero potential complementarities between rural licenses for both travel measures.
34Our airline passenger measure does not distinguish between origins and destinations, so we simply divide the formula
for the complementarity proxy by 2. If all airline travel is round-trips during the same calendar year, this measure should be
exactly correct.
195 Estimator for Multiple Item Auctions
5.1 Revealed Preferences and an Estimation Inequality
We will model which licenses to bid on at the end of the auction as an equilibrium discrete choice
problem. As we discussed in Section 3.5, the number of choices available to a bidder is very large,
which makes most approaches to estimating discrete choice models impractical. In this section, we
reduce the computational complexity of the estimation problem by demonstrating that, under appropri-
ate regularity conditions, static equilibrium in the ﬁnal round of the auction implies that a version of a
social planner’s problem is solved. The preferences in the static social planner’s problem are given by
the continuation values from the dynamic auction game. We can then estimate based upon much lower
dimensional inequalities that are necessary, but not sufﬁcient, conditions for the auction’s outcome to
be a solution of the static social planner’s problem.
Consider two bidders, a and b. In the data, bidder a wins the package of licenses Sa, and bidder b
wins the package of licenses Sb. The physical constraint that any license can be won only once means
Sa∩Sb = / 0. Let license i∈Sa and let license j ∈Sb. By Assumption 2 applied to each bidder separately,
it follows that
VaT (sT,Sa)+VbT (sT,Sb) ≥VaT (sT,(Sa\{i})∪{j})+VbT (sT,(Sb\{j})∪{i}). (4)
That is, the sum of the equilibrium continuation values for a and b is greater than the sum of the
continuation values where a wins j and b wins i, and all other assignments of licenses to bidders
remain unchanged.
Next, we will assume that the continuation values satisfy the following parametric functional form.
Assumption 3. For bidder a at the auction’s terminal node T, a’s continuation value for an arbitrary
package S satisﬁes





We will assume that the continuation value for winning the package of licenses S is an additive
function of three terms. The ﬁnal term is the sum of the ﬁnal prices piT of the licenses in S. The term
Va(sT,S)+åi∈Sxi is the non-price component of a’s continuation value for winning the licenses in S.
We decompose the non-price continuation values into two components. Va(S | b), is a bidder-speciﬁc
continuation value term that is parameterized by a vector of parameters b. Va(S | b) captures bidder-
speciﬁc valuations as well as the nonlinear interactions between the characteristics of different licenses
that create complementarities.
The second term åi∈Sxi is the sum of the license characteristics that are valued the same by all
bidders. As all bidders receive these beneﬁts, each xi is likely to affect the closing prices, but does not
affect the equilibrium assignment of bidders to licenses. While letting each xi enter only linearly rules
out possibly interesting interactions between the unobservable components of licenses, we shall show
20now that this assumption allows xi to be a function of characteristics that are observed to the bidders
but not the econometrician.
Under assumption 3 equation (4) becomes



















Notice that the same set of licenses, Sa ∪Sb, appears on the left and right hand sides, because the
inequality involves bidders a and b exchanging licenses. Subtraction simpliﬁes the inequality to
Va(Sa | b)+Vb(Sb | b) ≥Va((Sa\{i})∪{j} | b)+Vb((Sb\{j})∪{i} | b). (5)
Thus, the additivity in Assumption 3 causes the prices pkT and unobserved license characteristics xk to
drop out of our revealed preference inequality. In the context of a market where an unlimited number
of people can purchase the same item, Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) argue that
the presence of product characteristics that are unobserved to the econometrician but are observed to
market participants and are correlated with observed variables may generate severe biases in estimating
demand and supply parameters. In demand estimation, the main concern is that greater quality items
have higher prices. In the inequality in our equation (5), we difference out the prices and the unob-
served license characteristics. As we difference out prices anyway, our main concern in eliminating
the xk’s is that unobserved product characteristics may be correlated with included license and bidder
characteristics.35
The inequality in equation (5) is the basis for our estimator. The inequality is easy to compute
and differences out endogenous prices, pkT, and unobserved license characteristics, xk. We view the
robustness of our estimator to the bidder-invariant unmeasured characteristics of licenses included in
the xk’stobe amajor advantage. Ourpolicy interests focus on complementarities and implicit collusion.
Both concerns deal with the interaction of bidder characteristics and license characteristics. Empirical
work in the social sciences often has problems with omitted variables. In our approach, differencing out
unobserved heterogeneity in licenses and focusing on only aspects of license valuations that are directly
related to our policy interests makes our identiﬁcation strategy much less contaminated by unmeasured
variables.
Demange, Gale and Sotomayor (1986) and Hatﬁeld and Milgrom (2003), among others, have
pointed out that a generalization of an auction of multiple heterogeneous items is a two-sided matching
35It is difﬁcult to ﬁndinstruments for price, so inpractice Berryet al. (1995) assume that unobserved product characteristics
are not correlated with non-price, observed product characteristics. We do not need to assume that observed and unobserved
characteristics are uncorrelated.
21game. In a spectrum auction, the two sides of the market are bidders and licenses. The C block auction
has 255 bidders and 493 licenses. Each license can only make one “match” to a single bidder. We now
prove that the spectrum auction’s ﬁnal round is in a static equilibrium when static preferences are given
by continuation values, and where all licenses are won by only one bidder and no bidders would prefer
to match with other licenses.36
Result 1. Deﬁne a static equilibrium for the ﬁnal round of the spectrum auction to be a set of prices
and an assignment of licenses to bidders such that 1) Each license is won by only one bidder; 2) No
bidder would receives a higher continuation value from removing an individual license from its ﬁnal
package, and 3) No bidder would prefer to win a different package of licenses. If Assumptions 1 and
2 are satisﬁed for all bidders, the outcome of the auction is a static equilibrium for the continuation
values in the ﬁnal auction round.
Proof. 1) Each license is won by only one agent because the auction must clear markets license by
license. 2) Assumption 2 is satisﬁed for packages that contain fewer items than the packages won in
the auction. 3) This is a restatement of Assumption 2.
Next, we show that the outcome of the ﬁnal round of the auction solves an appropriately deﬁned
social planning problem in continuation values. We will refer to an allocation of licenses, Sa for the
a = 1,...,N bidders, as feasible if each license is allocated to a single bidder.
Result 2. If Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisﬁed for all bidders, the observed allocation of the licenses
maximizes the sum of the continuation values å
N
a=1VaT (sT,Sa) among all feasible allocations. Fur-
thermore if Assumption 3 is also satisﬁed, then the decentralized auction outcome maximizes the sum
of å
N
a=1Va(Sa | b) among all feasible allocations.
Proof. Compare the outcome of the auction, where a bidder a has winning package Sa, to some other
auction outcome where bidder a wins S′















for all alternative feasible allocations of the form {S′
a}
N
a=1. By Assumption 2, for each a the term
ViT (sT,Si) is weakly greater than VaT (sT,S′
a), so the entire sum in the left hand side is greater than the
sum on the right hand side.
36Hatﬁeld and Milgrom (2003) present counterexamples for general two-sided matching games that shows that there might
not be a static equilibrium when at least one agent has payoffs that feature complementarities across multiple matches. The
Hatﬁeld and Milgrom counterexample uses the freedom to choose any set of preferences, so it is not a proof that there does
exist equilibria in the C block spectrum auction. We must impose Assumption 2, rather than motivating it from sufﬁcient
primitive conditions about the lack of complementarities. The failure to ﬁnd a general existence theorem when there are
complementarities is also found in standard Walrasian competitive markets, as the second welfare theorem (there exists a
competitive equilibrium that generates each Pareto optimum) rules out complementarities. The lack of a general existence
theorem under complementarities is not a problem speciﬁc to multiple unit auctions or to matching.













as the prices in sT and the unmeasured license characteristics of the form xi difference out on both
sides, as the identities of the licenses for sale are the same on both sides of the inequality.
We note that this result is similar to the equivalence of the pairwise stable match solution to a
social planning problem in matching games where prices enter payoffs quasilinearly (Koopmans and
Beckmann, 1957; Shapley and Shubik, 1972; Becker, 1973; Sotomayor, 1992). The social planning
result shows that, given the continuation values in the ﬁnal round of the auction, the static equilibrium
assignment of bidders to licenses in the ﬁnal round is likely to be unique. If the continuation values
take random values over the entire real line, the probability that any two feasible allocations have the
same sum å
N
a=1Va(Sa | b) is 0.
As is typical in the discrete choice literature, we need to add random stochastic shocks so that the
econometric model can ﬁt any arbitrary assignment of licenses to bidders. The shocks are observed
by the agents, but not the econometrician, so from the econometrician’s viewpoint matches between
licenses and bidders happen with some probability. For any two sets of bidders a and b and any two
packages of licenses Sa and Sb, let Pab(Sa,Sb | X,b) be the probability that bidder a wins package Sa
and bidder b wins package Sb when the parameter vector in continuation values is b and X is a matrix
of observable covariates.37
A formal theoretical assumption that is required for our semiparametric estimator to be consistent
is that match probabilities for two bidders are rank ordered by the deterministic portions of contin-
uation values. This assumption is a stochastic version of equation (5), a necessary condition for the
deterministic social planner’s problem.
Assumption 4. Consider two licenses i ∈ Sa and j ∈ Sb, and two bidders a and b, where Sa∩Sb = / 0.
Assume that
Va(Sa | b,X)+Vb(Sb | b,X) >Va((Sa\{i})∪{j} | b,X)+Va((Sb\{j})∪{i} | b,X)
if and only if
Pab(Sa,Sb | X,b) > Pab((Sa\{i})∪{j},(Sb\{j})∪{i} | X,b).
Assumption 4 does not impose a known parametric functional form for the error terms (as in logit
and probit models), so theestimator based upon rank ordering matching probabilities issemiparametric.
37X is the matrix of the bidder and license characteristics for all bidders and licenses in the C block auction, not just
bidders a and b and the licenses in Sa and Sb. This is important for the asymptotic theory in Fox (2005a). The probability
Pab(Sa,Sb | X,b) is the sum of the probability of the subset of the 255493 = 2.65x101186 or so possible auction outcomes
where bidder a wins package Sa and bidder b wins package Sb.
23We focus on the probability of two packages being won by given bidders simultaneously because such
terms appear in the probability limit of the matching estimator introduced below.38 The rank ordering
property is an extension of a single-agent rank ordering property introduced by Manski (1975), which
states that a single-agent chooses a discrete action i with greater probability than j if the deterministic
part of the utility from i is greater than from j. Manski (1975) and Fox (2005b) discuss how a sufﬁcient
condition for the single-agent rank ordering property is that the error terms in the random utility model
have an exchangeable joint density.
In a matching market, Fox (2005a) discusses several frameworks that can motivate Assumption 4.
The most mathematically straightforward story is that random errors prevent the market from forming
the exact static equilibrium that maximizes continuation values in the ﬁnal round. In a market with
transferable utility, the equivalent of the single agent from Manski (1975) is the social planner. A
mathematically equivalent alternative to computing a decentralized equilibrium in the ﬁnal round is to
have the social planner make a discrete choice between the 255493 = 2.65x101186 auction outcomes in
the C block, given the continuation values at the end of the auction. Fox (2005a) proves that a sufﬁcient
condition that will generate Assumption 4 is that the social planner’s error terms have an exchangeable
joint density.
Another story is that bidders have idiosyncratic bidder-license payoffs eai, so that the continuation
value of a bidder has the random utility form Va(Sa | b,X)+åi∈Sa eai for bidder a and package Sa.
However, to be clear, Fox (2005a) shows that it is not a theorem that the rank order property holds
when the density for the vector of eai’s is exchangeable.39 However, the rank order property might
hold if the variance of the error terms is small. Section 2.2 shows that most major winners in the C
block were large scale investors that operated on a national scale. The major players were not local
businessmen exploiting idiosyncratic knowledge but investors concerned with the national industry
structure. Therefore, on a priori grounds we feel it is likely that the role for the bidder-license speciﬁc
error is indeed low. Our structural estimates reported below ﬁt the data very well, so we are ex post
comfortable that our included covariates are good proxies for the major components of continuation
values.
5.2 The Maximum Score Estimator for Multiple-Unit Auctions
Fox (2005a) introduces a matching games estimator based on the social planning problem, or equiv-
alently the set of physical pairings in a decentralized static equilibrium.40 The matching estimator
38Fox (2005a) proves that the matching estimator is consistent using a general consistency theorem from Newey and
McFadden (1994). Part of proving an extremum estimator is consistent is showing that the probability limit of the objective
function is uniquely maximized at the true parameter value, and Assumption 4 concerns terms appearing in the probability
limit that make such a proof possible.
39The reason is each of the social planner’s auctionwide outcomes has many component matches between bidders and
licenses, and the outcomes with some overlap of individual license assignments have correlated composite errors. A coun-
terexample to Manski’s rank ordering property for single-agent discrete choice models is when there is correlation across in
the error terms for choices such that the resulting joint density of the error terms is not exchangeable.
40The equivalence of the social planning and decentralized equilibrium solutions is also employed for estimation in a
24is computationally simple, because it relies on the payoff maximizing property of the equilibrium,
rather than computing an equilibrium. As the set of physical pairings in a stable match is a qualitative
outcome, the estimation strategy builds on results in the single-agent discrete choice literature. The
matching games estimator in Fox (2005a) is an evolution of the single-agent discrete choice maximum
score estimators of Manski (1975), Matzkin (1993) and Fox (2005b).
We are ready to write down the estimator. We use notation that emphasizes what the objective
function looks like for our sample, rather than notation that makes it easier to compute the objective










Va(i)(Si | b,X)+Va(j)(Sj | b,X) >
Va(i)((Si\{i})∪{j} | b,X)+Va(j)((Sj\{j})∪{i} | b,X)
￿
. (7)
The function 1[ ] is the indicator function, which is equal to 1 if the inequality in brackets is true, and 0
otherwise. The number 480 is the total number of licenses for sale in the continental United States. As
there are two summations, the objective function considers two licenses, i and j, at a time. Only pairs
of licenses with different winners are considered. The objective function then considers the winning
package that contains i, Si, and the winning package that contains the license j, Sj. One bidder in the
data, a(i), won the package Sj, and another bidder, a(j), won Sj. The objective function considers a
counterfactual situation where instead bidder a(i) won license j and bidder a(j) won license i. The
sum of the continuation values for the two bidders at the round the auction ended in the data under this
alternative outcome is
Va(i)((Si\{i})∪{j} | b,X)+Va(j)((Sj\{j})∪{i} | b,X),
where the set operators show that i is added to a(i)’s package and subtracted from a(j)’s package,
and similarly for j. The objective function’s score of correct predictions according to Assumption
4, equation (7), only increases by 1 when the observed outcome gives a greater sum of deterministic
continuation values than the alternative where licenses i and j exchange winning bidders.
Because Assumption 4 considers exchanging only two licenses at a time, the matching maximum
score estimator does not need to consider all possible combinations oflicenses. Therefore, the matching
estimator does not have a computational curse of dimensionality in the size of the market. Considering
only a subset of license exchanges is a strong advantage, as the number of number of packages of
multiple C block licenses is the number of elements of the power set of all licenses in the continental
marriage market setting by Choo and Siow (2003). The parametric error term assumptions of Choo and Siow act like a
single-agent discrete choice problem, and do not enforce the physical constraint that each man can marry only one woman,
or each license can be won by only one bidder.
25United States, or 2480. We focus on exchanges of only one license for each bidder in order to make
the estimator use a local notion of identiﬁcation, rather than out-of-sample extrapolations. Also, using
a simple rule, all exchanges of one license, makes the results replicatable as no extra randomization
contributes to the reported estimates.41
Exchanging only two licenses at a time involves relatively small counterfactuals. In the C block,
NextWave won the New York City license and a smaller winner named Americal won the Corpus
Christi, Texas license. Our identiﬁcation strategy asks why this outcome was likely to have a jointly
higher continuation value than if instead Americal won New York City and NextWave won Corpus
Christi. By considering only small changes to packages, we are exploiting variation in the outcomes
that was more likely possible towards the end of the auction. Note that all of our counterfactual pos-
sibilities in the estimator involve bidders winning packages with the same number of licenses. We do
not consider wildly out of sample counterfactuals, such as Americal winning a package of 50 licenses
in large metropolitan areas and NextWave winning only one license in a rural area. This is our attempt
to impose some sort of budget constraint. It is unlikely Americal had the ﬁnancial resources to even
consider bidding on such an out-of-sample package.42
If Assumption 4 holds, Fox (2005a) proves the matching maximum score estimator used in this
paper is consistent, as the number of matching markets (auctions) goes to inﬁnity. Observing many
similar economic situations, in this case auction markets, is a key part of almost any consistency ar-
gument. By contrast, this paper uses data on only the C block spectrum auction. The C block was a
unique market experiment in economic history. The C block attracted only new entrants to the mobile
phone industry. These potential new carriers were mainly investors not tied beforehand to any region
of the country. The outcome of the $10.1 billion auction shows how these bidders sorted themselves
into packages of winning licenses. If we properly control for implicit collusion, the C block experiment
allows us to see how a segment of an industry simultaneously decided to organize itself. So while ob-
serving a large number of similar auctions is necessary for the consistency argument, we choose to use
the estimator for a ﬁnite sample of one very large auction in order to focus our attention on a unique
market experiment.
5.3 Continuation Value Functional Form
We have discussed the matching games estimator for a general parametric functional form for contin-
uation values. Now we introduce the actual functional form that we will estimate.43 The functional
41We discuss later that empirical experimentation shows that the point estimates when the objective function includes
exchanges of two licenses per bidder (four total) are qualitatively similar.
42The formal theory of matching imposes quotas on the number of matches each agent can make. Our estimator keeps the
number of licenses in each winner’s package the same, so we do not violate any such quotas. Unfortunately, standard models
of matching do not allow for monetary budget constraints. We could consider only inequalities that keep the total expenditure
of a bidder under the sum of the prices of its winning licenses in the data. We are concerned that the endogenous prices are
correlated with unobserved variables, and we have not proved the consistency of the matching estimator for this case.
43Introducing a parametric functional form for continuation values simpliﬁes numerical optimization, as the computer
needs to search only over a ﬁnite dimensional parameter space. Fox (2005a) presents a fully nonparametric analysis of
26form is motivated by the fact that the bidders in the C block spectrum auction are potential mobile
phone carriers. These carriers want to offer mobile phone service to customers. Our functional form
emphasizes that the quality-adjusted population, q, is the most important package characteristic, as a
mobile phone carrier needs potential customers for its service. Indeed, Figure 2 shows that population
is by far the most important characteristic in the price of licenses. Other characteristics of a package of
licenses should only adjust the value of a single resident up or down a little.
As before, let Va(S | b,X) be the portion of the parametric form that depends on the unknown
parameters b and that enters the estimator. For a package of licenses S, bidder a has a continuation
value






Quality-adjusted population q(S) is the main package characteristic affecting continuation values. It
enters the continuation value, equation (8), as a quadratic. The parameter bsq controls the importance
of operating scale. If bsq >0, payoffs are convex in quality-adjusted population, and therefore there are
increasing returns to operating scale. Scale economies are one reason licenses might be complements.








where the listed characteristics are observable characteristics of a package. For example, incomeS is the
percentage of high-income customers in a package. If binc >0, then a bidder values the total population
of a package with richer residents more than a package with poorer residents. If bsyn > 0, then there
are returns to the geographic scope proxy synergyS, which can be geographic distance or a measure of
travel between licenses.
The log of bidder a’s eligibility, as described in Table 1, multiplies the quadratric in q(S). This
is because the matching estimator asks why bidder a won license i and bidder b license j rather than
the reverse. Only portions of payoffs that are interacted with observable bidder characteristics, in this
case initial eligibility, are identiﬁable, as the auctionwide sum of continuation values from interacted
characteristics changes if the license is assigned to another bidder. The parameter g in equation (8)
translates the identiﬁable portion of continuation values into monetary units. The matching estimator
does not use the price data, so the scale of payoffs in monetary units is not identiﬁable. We impose the
scale normalization that g = +1, or that bidders with more eligibility value quality-adjusted population
more than those who chose not to commit many resources to the auction.44 The correlation between a
bidder’s initial eligibility and the population of its winning package is 0.76. Note that our use of only
identiﬁcation and maximum score estimation, where the functional form of Va(S | b,X) is unspeciﬁed within a large class of
possible continuation value functions.
44The sign of g, but not its scale, can be superconsistently estimated in the maximum score framework. It is a standard
result in semiparametric discrete choice estimation that location and scale normalizations must be imposed on the unknown
parameter vector, and qualitative outcome data do not impose particular cardinalizations for utility functions (Horowitz,
1998). Only the ordinal ranking of payoffs are identiﬁable from qualitative data such as matches of bidders to licenses.
27the qualitative outcome data on which bidders won which licenses differentiates this paper from many
other structural auction papers, which focus on variation in bids.
The fact that our empirical proxies, such as the complementarities between licenses, are non-
additive functions of the characteristics of all licenses also provides identiﬁcation. The complemen-
tarities from adding Orlando, FL to a package containing Miami and Tampa, FL is presumably more
than a package containing San Francisco and Los Angeles, CA.
6 Estimates of Complementarities and Implicit Collusion
We will use our estimates of continuation values to gain some insight into whether bidders value com-
plementarities and whether bidders fear setting off a price war.
Table 5 lists estimates of b in continuation values, equation (8), from using the two-sided matching
games estimator.45 The numbers reported are 95% conﬁdence intervals from subsampling.46 Column
1 is a simple speciﬁcation that only includes the percentage of high-income households as a package
characteristic. Consider a bidder with ﬁxed level of initial eligibility. Increasing the percentage of high
income households in a package by 1% will increase the continuation value of the package by 6%. Now
consider two bidders, one whose initial eligibility is twice that of another (whose log eligibility is the
log of 2 or 0.69 points higher). The bidder with twice the initial eligibility will value the 1% increase
in the high-income household percentage 0.69 0.06 = 4% more than the lower eligibility bidder.
Columns (2)–(4) are much more interesting speciﬁcations that attempt to address the key questions
raised in the paper by including proxies for implicit collusion (jump bidding), and two types of comple-
mentarities, operating scale (the quadratic term in quality-adjusted population), and geographic scope.
Column (2) contains a speciﬁcation where the geographic scope proxy is a measure of the population
of two licenses divided by the distance between them. All the coefﬁcients are statistically different
from 0.
From Table 4, the mean value of this geographic distance measure is 0.006. Doubling this ﬁgure to
0.012 results in a 0.006×26.93 =16.2% increase in a bidder’s valuation. This is a very substantial role
for the economies of geographic scope, and thus for complementarities. Understanding the total role of
complementarities requires looking at the coefﬁcient on the quadratic in quality-adjusted population,
45The objective function was numerically maximized using the global optimization algorithm known as differential evolu-
tion (Storn and Price, 1997). More than ten runs were performed for all speciﬁcations. The reported point estimates are the
best found maxima, although care was taken to ensure that runner up computed maxima were qualitatively the same as the
best found values.
46Subsampling is a resampling procedure discussed in Politis, Romano and Wolf (1999). Subsampling does not require
the objective function to be continuous, and has been proved to be consistent for single-agent binary choice maximum score
estimators by Delgado, Rodríguez-Poo and Wolf (2001). We use fake data sets of 100 licenses. Our subsampling procedure
is somewhat ad hoc from an asymptotic theory standpoint, as the formal asymptotics in Fox (2005a) are in the number of
markets going to inﬁnity instead of the number of licenses in a market, and in this paper we data on only one market, the C
block spectrum auction. Also, subsampling has not been extended to allow for spatial autocorrelation, so we do not adjust
for such correlation, although see Politis and Romano (1993) for results on the bootstrap, which is inconsistent for maximum
score estimators.
28which is estimated to be −0.00440. The coefﬁcient is negative, meaning the model estimates that there
are decreasing returns to operating scale. For a package of 10 million people evaluated at typical values
for the other characteristics, the decreasing returns to scale decrease the package’s value by 1.7%.47
However, for a package with 50 million people (1/5 of the US population), the decreasing returns to
scale blow up and decrease the package’s total value by 9.4%. The point estimates show important
positive returns to geographic scope, and somewhat less important negative returns to operating scale.
It is interesting that including other covariates dramatically changes the point estimate for income
from 6.12to -1.21. Nowa1% increase inthe high income household percentage decreases the valuation
by 1.21%, instead of raising it by 6% without other controls. The change in the sign of a coefﬁcient
once other variables are controlled for means that simply staring at a map with only one characteristic
plotted is a poor substitute for a multivariate analysis, just as multiavariate least squares produces
different slope coefﬁcient estimates than univariate least squares applied to each regressor separately.
Note that in many other speciﬁcations, including linear price regressions, measures of income had
negative signs once other regressors were included. The negative sign is not an artifact of the matching
estimator alone.
Another important question we examine is the importance of attempts at implicit collusion in con-
tinuation values. We proxy for attempts at intimidation with the presence of jump bids. A typical
license in a package has 2 jump bids by bidders who eventually do not win the license. A package with
2 jump bids per license has a continuation value that is 6.5% lower than one with only 1 jump bid. So
the mean package’s complementarities (16.2%) has an effect roughly equal to two jump bids (13.0%).
We return to this point in the discussion of the policy implications of our results.
As for data ﬁt, 105,896 (95.2%) of the 111,192 pairwise combinations of licenses won by differ-
ent bidders that enter the objective function are predicted correctly according to Assumption 4. The
assumption rank orders match probabilities by the sums of pairs of continuation values. There is not
much more variation left in the license assignments to explain, with just four covariates included in the
model.
Column (3) replaces geographic distance complementarities with the measure based upon air travel.
In Column (3), the estimated coefﬁcient on jump bids is statistically the same as in Column (2). The
coefﬁcient on income changes from -1.21 to -1.02, so that a 1% increase in income decreases the
quality-adjusted population by 1%. The coefﬁcient on air travel is statistically not different than 0 and
economically small. The mean level of within-package air travel of 26.1 (in thousands of passengers)
raises the quality-adjusted population value by 0.16% over a package with no air travel. Air travel does
not have a large contribution towards the economics of geographic scope. Note also that the column
with air travel has a lower number of correct predictions: 83.5% of license combinations are predicted
47The number 1.7% is calculated as follows. The quality-adjusted population for a package with 10 million people and
other characteristics at their mean values is 10 (1+0.006 26.93)(1−2.6 0.0646)(1−0.46 1.21) =4.29. Total normalized
package value (before multiplication by a bidder’s characteristic) is then 4.29−0.0040 4.29, and the ratio of −0.0040 4.29
is −0.017.
29correctly at the estimated parameter values. Air travel ﬁts the data poorly, compared to geographic
distance between licenses. The returns to operating scale in Column (3) are negative, but smaller in
magnitude than the negative returns to scale with the geographic distance complementarity measure in
Column (2). The returns to scale decrease package value by 0.6% for a package of 10 million people,
and 3.5% for a package with 50 million people.
Column (4) switches to the third geographic scope proxy: the number of trips between licenses
in a package, as recorded by the American Travel Survey (ATS). According to the sample statistics in
Table 4, the mean winning package has 53 such trips, and the standard deviation is 310. Doubling the
mean number of trips, results in a 53 0.000934 = 5.0% increase in the quality-adjusted population that
enters continuation values. The signs and magnitudes of the coefﬁcients on income, the mean number
of jump bids and the quadratic in resident quality are similar to the results in Column (2).
7 Implications for the Geographic Size of Spectrum Licenses
We prefer the point estimates in Column (2) of Table 5 as our ﬁnal results. With 95.2% of the license
switches correctly predicted according to the rank order property in Assumption 4, we feel our covari-
ates are able to robustly ﬁt the data. There are two main results from our preferred speciﬁcation. First,
we ﬁnd that our proxy for attempts at implicit collusion, the number of jump bids by rival bidders, does
decrease the continuation value of a package of licenses. A package with an extra jump bid per license
in it has its value reduced by 6.5%. Second, we ﬁnd that our proxy for geographic complementarities,
based on the population of other licenses in a package divided by geographic distance, is strongly pos-
itively correlated with continuation values. Using the sample statistics from Table 4, we ﬁnd that a one
standard deviation increase in our complementarity proxy raises total package value by 41%.48 The
point estimate of a large return to geographic scope is offset somewhat by a negative point estimate
for the returns to operating scale, although the positive scope effect is several times larger at typical
covariate values.
In the introduction, we mentioned that the FCC is considering policy changes where it will auction
some a block of Advanced Wireless Service licenses for mobile phone carriers that each cover one-
twelfth of the United States, although another block will be split into 734 geographic license. These
licensing schemes bracket the 493 markets seen in the C block. The spectrum block with twelve
geographic licenses moves the United States closer to the European system, where countries often
issue nationwide spectrum licenses.
Our ﬁndings of large complementarities support the idea that larger licenses will ensure that more
winning carriers will be able to operate on a more efﬁcient scale. Larger licenses leave less of a chance
for auction idiosyncrasies to cause an inefﬁcient assignment. The fact that our included covariates are
able to predict 95.2% of the licenses decisions correctly suggests that the role for the error terms in
48This number is 26.93 0.0151.
30these auctions is low. Perhaps bidders do not have strong preferences for certain licenses, meaning that
auctioning larger licenses might not cause a great destruction in the idiosyncratic or regional knowledge
of certain carriers that would be best captured by offering small licenses. The role of complementarities
does justify using a simultaneous ascending bid auction, which is designed to allow bidders to assemble
packages of licenses exhibiting complementarities.
Consistent with earlier descriptive empirical work on spectrum auctions by Cramton and Schwartz
(2000), and with the theoretical analysis of Brusco and Lopomo (2002), we ﬁnd that attempts at in-
timidation through jump bidding affect the assignment of licenses. The presence of intimidation likely
means that the C block auction was at least partially inefﬁcient in its ﬁnal assignment.
Under a system of larger licenses, there might be less scope for intimidation. In the extreme case
of offering only one nationwide license, there would be little to gain from colluding with rivals, as only
one carrier can walk away with the license. On the other hand, entry in auctions is important to prevent
intimidation from a small number of bidders. Offering only one nationwide license would discourage
participation from all but a few larger players. A small number of bidders could collude before or
during the auction to depress the revenue earned by the US Treasury.
As we discussed in Section 2.1, the C block auction fulﬁlled a Congressional mandate to open the
wireless phone industry to small business entrants. Not all of the C block bidders were truly small
businesses. However, real small businesses cannot hope to start nationwide mobile phone carriers
from scratch. Our ﬁnding of strong geographic complementarities suggests that encouraging small
businesses to offer mobile phone service does not maximize societal output.
8 Wider Discussion
8.1 Robustness of the Matching Estimator to Choice of Inequalities
The reported estimates in Table 5use inequalities with exchanges of only one license per bidder, for two
total. This deterministic rule aids replication as randomization plays no rule in the objective function.
Alternatively, we could have proceeded by randomly choosing inequalities where bidders exchanges
two licenses, for four total. When the estimator includes exchanges of mainly two licenses per bidder,
estimates for the speciﬁcation with geographic distance complementarities (column (2) in Table 5) are
-1.40 for income, 21.89 for geographic distance, -0.075 for jump bids, and -0.00882 for the quadratic
term in quality-adjusted population.49 We have performed other robustness checks and feel that the
coefﬁcient estimates are qualitatively robust to the set of inequalities used in estimation.
49These estimates come from a speciﬁcation where the inequalities overweight exchanges of pairs of adjacent licenses.
When a large bidder wins multiple clusters of licenses, the pair of licenses being exchanged is more likely to be licenses in
the same cluster rather than different clusters. For bidders who win only one license, only one license is exchanged for that
bidder.
318.2 Matching vs. Other Estimators
We feel that the matching estimator best ﬁts the economic primitives of a spectrum auction. As in
a matching game, a spectrum auction has a ﬁnite number of bidders, a ﬁnite number of licenses for
sale, and all bidders and licenses are observably heterogeneous both to the econometrician and to other
bidders in the auction. Although the estimator does not use price data, the estimator is only consistent
for a matching model with endogenous prices, just as a spectrum auction elicits a vector of prices that
end the auction.
As discussed in Section 3.5, a major problem in estimation using discrete choice methods is that the
number of possible outcomes for a single agent, the number of distinct packages of licenses, is unfath-
omable. The number of auction-wide outcomes is the number of combinations of feasible outcomes
for all bidders, which is even larger. The matching estimator addresses the computational concern by
using only weak implications of the theory. It uses restrictions involving only small deviations of two
licenses exchanging ownership.
However, throughout the course of our empirical work, we have implemented other estimators
that are consistent under different assumptions about competition. The only two known single-agent
discrete choice estimators that are consistent when using covariate data on only a subset of the possible
winning packages are the McFadden (1978) subset logit estimator and the single-agent maximum score
estimator of Fox (2005b). Single-agent methods suffer because the revealed preference of an agent to
stop bidding is a function of the vector of closing prices, but the prices are functions of valuations
for all 255 bidders. The single-agent discrete choice methods cannot elegantly handle the complex
endogeneity of prices in a multiple-unit auction. The matching model solves the price endogeneity
problem by ﬁnding equilibrium restrictions that hold because of the presence of prices, but which do
not use price data.
We have also estimated the hedonic model of Bajari and Benkard (2003). This method treats
packages of licenses as a bundle of continuous characteristics in covariate space. The hedonic estimator
uses nonparametric methods to regress the closing prices of the 85 winning prices on characteristics of
those packages. Inasecond stage, bidder-speciﬁc random coefﬁcients incontinuation values arebacked
out from ﬁrst-order conditions relating the price gradient to the marginal beneﬁt of each characteristic.
The hedonic method relies critically on the researcher’s ability to correctly estimate the slope of the
hedonic price function at every point in a multivariate package characteristics space. That is difﬁcult
with data on only 85 winning packages. The matching estimator in this paper ignores entirely variation
in price, and works more directly with the characteristics of bidders and packages.
8.3 Complementarities vs. Correlated Preferences
The FCC spectrum auction design allows bidders to assemble a package of licenses that have the
potential for complementarities. The C block bidder Carolina PCS won a package of licenses for most
of South Carolina. Our estimates in Table 5 attribute this bidder’s payoffs to complementarities, as our
32matching estimator does not allow errors to be idiosyncratically correlated (non-exchangeable) across
licenses. Another explanation is that Carolina PCS has preferences for licenses in the southeastern
United States.50
We recognize that any choice data can be explained by an arbitrarily complex distribution of
stochastic errors without regard to deterministic payoff terms. However, we can limit ourselves to
a reasonable class of correlated payoffs, based upon the notion that each bidder has a spatial bliss
point. If each bidder has a bliss point, we expect bidders to win licenses mainly in the same region
of the United States. Only two of the top ten winning C block bidders by population won licenses in
only one region. ChaseTel purchased licenses to cover all of Tennessee and some bordering areas, and
another bidder (Carolina PCS) won licenses for most of South Carolina.51 The other top ten bidders (in
terms of population) that did win licenses in clusters did so in multiple areas of the country. For exam-
ple, the carrier GWI/MetroPCS won licenses in southern Florida, the greater Atlanta area, and northern
California. While it is possible GWI/MetroPCS had correlated payoffs for only those three regions, we
(subjectively) feel complementarities are a much more likely explanation for GWI/MetroPCS’s license
clusters.52
8.4 Bankruptcy and Moral Hazard / Adverse Selection
This paper stops at the C block auction and does not consider the outcomes of bidders after they won
their licenses and became mobile phone carriers. In fact, as we discuss in Section 2.1, many winners
were unable to both repay the FCC and fund the enormous capital investments needed to operate a
mobile phone network. Zhèng (2001) analyzes a ﬁrst-price sealed-bid auction and suggests that bidders
may strategically anticipate the possibility of default. In an equilibrium with default and low interest
rates, bidders with less collateral bid more aggressively because they will have less at risk in a state
of the world where default occurs. Default then leads to an adverse selection problem where bidders
with fewer ﬁnancial resources win more licenses. Zhèng’s story has similar observable implications to
the winners’ curse in common value auctions, where the winning bidder is always the bidder who has
an overly ambitious signal about the value of the item for sale. We ﬁnd evidence that bidders with a
stronger initial commitment to the auction won larger packages of licenses, which is consistent but not
conﬁrmatory of theories about the winner’s curse and moral hazard due to bankruptcy protection.53
50Distinguishing between true complementarities and correlated preferences is important for auction design. Without
complementarities and ignoring strategic behavior, a sequence of separate ascending-bid auctions for each license ensures
that all licenses are awarded to the bidders with the highest idiosyncratic payoff. The simultaneous auctioning of all licenses,
as implemented by the FCC, is important mainly because of the potential for true complementarities between licenses in a
package.
51Both ChaseTel and Carolina PCS sold their licenses to national carriers before establishing serious market positions as
independent carriers. A third top ten bidder won licenses in a narrow, geographically contiguous band stretching from Detroit
to Dallas, although this area is so diverse it is hard to explain with a geographic preferences explanation.
52Most of the winning bidders were large-scale investors willing to operate outside their home regions. For example, one
of the largest winners in the continental United States was based in Puerto Rico.
53In a common values auction, bidders are unsure about the true value of the good. An ascending bid auction reveals a lot
of information about the signals other bidders have about the value of the good. By the end of the auction, bidders should
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The FCC auctions licenses to operate mobile phone carriers in geographic markets. An important
policy question is whether the geographic size of these licenses should be enlarged for future auctions.
Enlarging the size of geographic licenses will ensure that auction irregularities such as attempts at
implicit collusion do not dramatically restrict the ability of winning carriers to achieve economies of
operating scale and geographic scope.
We empirically examine the C block spectrum auction, where bids for the 89 winning bidders
totaled $10.1 billion. We estimate whether bidders’ continuation values are functions of proxies for
potential complementarities between multiple licenses in a winning package, and whether a proxy
for attempts at collusion make a package of licenses less attractive. Our main proxy for potential
complementarities is a measure of the population-weighted distance between licenses in a package,
and our main proxy for attempts at intimidation is the history of jump bids on a license.
The C block spectrum auction is a simultaneous ascending auction that lasted 184 rounds, had 255
bidders, and offered 493 licenses for sale. The equilibrium in such a complex dynamic game with
repeated interaction and multiple-market contact is not known and is not computable. Therefore, we
base identiﬁcation on relatively weak conditions about the behavior of agents at the end of the auction.
We assume that the auction creates a vector of prices where no bidder would prefer to withdraw from its
winning licenses and bid on others at the end of the auction. Justifying this assumption is the presence
of a rarely used withdrawal option in the FCC’s rules.
We estimate bidders’ continuation values using a two-sided matching estimator. The estimator is
for a matching market with endogenous prices, but does not use data on prices. Instead, the estimator
uses the revealed preference argument to state that the economy-wide sum of continuation values is
maximized at the closing set of license assignments. The estimator uses data on the characteristics of
winning bidders, winning packages, and hypothetical winning packages where the ownership of two
licenses has been exchanged between two bidders. Thus, identiﬁcation comes from the joint incidence
of winning licenses within a package and the identities of bidders. The objective function is compu-
tationally simple, and the estimator is semiparametric, as it does not rely on specifying a parametric
distribution for the error terms.
We ﬁnd that our proxies for geographic scope and attempts at implicit collusion contribute strongly
to continuation values. Packages with one more previous jump bid for a license have a 7% lower con-
tinuation values. A one standard deviation increase in our complementarity proxy raises total package
value by 33%. The fact that intimidation has the potential to affect ﬁnal license assignments means that
be pretty informed about the common value component, and what is left of the winner’s curse probably reﬂects an aggregate
information shock, or raw uncertainty about the prospects for new entrants in the mobile phone industry that cannot be
averaged out in an auction. Hong and Shum (2003) estimate the rate of learning of bidders in the AB block spectrum auction
and ﬁnd that bidders do shade their bid curves as rival bidders drop out of bidding in the ascending auction. This shows that
bidders do learn. Hong and Shum interpret their results as suggesting bidders are symmetric, as their informational draws are
consistent with a pattern of arising from the same underlying distribution.
34the auction may not succeed in producing an efﬁcient outcome in ﬁnal structural payoffs (as opposed
to continuation values). Increasing the size of geographic licenses offered for sale may ensure that
the mobile phone industry realizes potential returns to geographic scope without the need for costly
post-auction reorganization through mergers and resale.
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39Figure 2: Winning Bids by the Population of the 493 C Block Licenses
40Figure 3: Winning Bidsper Resident by thePopulation of Licenses with Fewerthan 5Million Residents
41Figure 4: Map of the Price per Resident for Licenses
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43Figure 6: The Number of Jump Bids per Round
44Table 1: Characteristics of Winners and non-Winners of Packages in the Continental United States
Winners non-Winners
Characteristic Mean Stand. Dev. Mean Stand. Dev.
Initial Eligibility (millions of residents) 9.77 27.2 5.15 18.5
Assets ($ millions) 13.1 21.8 12.3 18.8
Revenues ($ millions) 40.7 67.8 39.9 72.3
# of licenses won 5.3 7.1 0 0
# of licenses ever bid on 38.5 70.6 14.8 44.2
# of bidders 85 170
45Table 2: Total Closing Prices and Population Characteristics of 85 Winning Packages
Characteristic Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
Total price ($millions) 116.2 496.1 0.102 4,201
Total population in 1994 (millions) 2.91 10.93 0.027 93.8
% of Households with Income > $35K 46.0 6.9 28.9 62.5
46Table 3: Within-Package Weighted Mean Number of Jump Bids of Rival Bidders
Characteristic Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
Jump bids (#) 2.60 2.43 0 15
47Table 4: Within-Package Population Weighted Means of Geographic Scope Proxies
Characteristic Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
Population / distance two markets in a package 0.00601 0.0151 0 0.115
(millions of people/distance in km)
Trips between markets in a package 53.2 311 0 2660
in the American Travel Survey
Total trips between airports in markets 26.1 112 0 912















































































Characteristic (1) (2) (3) (4)
Total population in 1994 (millions) 1 1 1 1
Households with income >$35K (%) 6.12 -1.21 -1.02 -1.24
(binc) (4.59,18.1) (-1.27,-0.87) (-1.11,-0.876) (-1.31,-1.09)






Population weighted mean of within-package 0.0000616





Population weighted mean of within-package 0.000934















% Score of Correct Predictions in Objective Function 36.9% 95.2% 83.5% 85.4%
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